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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STAT]EME;^fTQFKSUPS 
The determinative issue(s) in this case is whether the trial court erred in determining that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Because Appellant 
believes that the trial court erred in several particulars, Appellant states the issues as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to whether the parties reached an 
agreement. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the alleged terms of the alleged 
agreement between the parties. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the purpose that funds were deposited 
in escrow. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the "Formalization Agreement" and 
the repudiation of the alleged agreement. 
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5. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the "Confirmation Memo." 
6. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the escrow instructions. 
7. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to whether the acts of the parties 
demonstrated the existence of an enforceable agreement between the parties. 
8. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the trial court's conclusion that the 
form and effect of the "Formalization Agreement" was not material to Appellee's claim. 
9. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to whether there was actually a meeting 
of the minds or mutual assent of the parties. 
10. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment when it determined that if there was an agreement 
entered into between the parties, such agreement was not repudiated by a separate agreement 
reached between the parties on the following day. 
11. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding summary judgment when it concluded that there was no basis for 
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estopping Appellee from enforcing the "Conformation Memo" and that both parties should instead 
be estopped from denying the existence of the alleged agreement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court is called upon in this appeal to review the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in a number of particulars. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). This Court accords "no deference to the trial court's conclusion 
that the facts are not in dispute nor the court's legal conclusions based on those facts." Kitchen 
v. Col. Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (1992).l 
Additionally, this Court "review[s] all relevant facts, including all inferences arising from those 
facts, in a light most favorable to the losing party." Id. This has been interpreted to mean that 
this Court must accept Appellant's facts as set forth before the trial court and in sworn testimony 
and they determine whether the facts create genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g., Beehive 
Brick Co. V. Robinson Brick Co. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989). Under applicable standards 
of review, this Court must resolve all doubts in favor of Appellant. Draper Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Lawson, 675 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983). "If, after a review of the record, it appears that there is a 
1
 Said another way, because this Court resolves only legal issues when reviewing a grant 
of summary judgment, it does not defer to the trial court's ruling in any particular. Ferree v. 
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
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material factual issue, [this Court is] compelled to reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. V. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). "One sworn 
statement under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual 
issue, thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment." Id. With respect to this Court's 
handling of its review of the facts in an appeal from a summary judgment motion, it is improper 
for the trial court or this Court on appeal to weigh the evidence or assess its credibility or make 
any determination about the opposing party's ultimate chance of prevailing in a trial on the merits. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); 
accord Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah App. 1988).2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Appellant is unaware of any statutes that are determinative in this action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves a dispute between Appellant and Appellee as to whether they actually 
entered into an agreement and, if so, what the terms of the agreement actually are. Appellee 
2
 In White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
this issue and cast some dispersions on whether the party opposing summary judgment and 
appealing the grant of summary judgment could actually prevail in a trial on the merits. The Court 
noted, however, that such consideration at the appellate level was not appropriate. The Court was 
obligated to resolve all doubts in that party's favor regardless of how the Court felt about that party's 
ability to ultimately succeed at trial. 
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maintains that the parties reached a binding agreement. Appellant, on the other hand, maintains 
that the parties did not reach an agreement, but instead only participated in preliminary 
discussions and negotiations. In short, that there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent. 
Appellant further maintains that even if it can be argued that the parties reached an agreement, 
the parties have not agreed to numerous and material terms and conditions thereof. As a result, 
Appellant maintains that there were numerous genuine issues of material fact both with respect 
to whether the parties actually entered into an agreement and the terms and conditions of any 
alleged agreement. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Appellant was a general contractor on a large industrial project in Beaver County, Utah. 
Appellee was hired by a sub-contractor to perform certain tasks and supply certain material on the 
project. The sub-contractor failed to pay Appellee for its services on the project. Appellee 
threatened to file a mechanic's lien on the project. Appellant entered into discussions and 
negotiations with Appellee with the goal of avoiding the filing of a mechanic's lien. As part of 
the negotiations, Appellant escrowed a significant amount of money as a show of good faith and 
which Appellee could access if efforts failed to force the sub-contractor to pay the money owing 
to Appellee. 
Appellee apparently believed that it had entered into an agreement with Appellant. When 
Appellee deemed that Appellant had not performed under the alleged agreement, Appellee filed 
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a Complaint for Breach of Contract against Appellee. Shortly thereafter, Appellee filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether a legally enforceable agreement existed between 
the parties. Appellant both answered the Complaint and opposed the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Judge J. Philip Eves in the Fifth District in and for Beaver County granted Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and held that an enforceable agreement did exist between the 
parties. 
Disposition of the Trial Court 
Judge J. Philip Eves in the Fifth District in and for Beaver County granted Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and held that an enforceable agreement did exist between the 
parties. Because it is a summary judgment action, inherent in the trial court's ruling is the 
conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the parties 
actually entered into an alleged agreement or with respect to the terms of the alleged agreement 
itself. As shown below, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact and the trial court 
erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For illustrative purposes, because this is an appeal from a summary judgment and because 
this Court gives no deference to the trial court in this context, Appellant states the facts as 
follows: 
1. Facts as set forth in the trial court by Appellant; and 
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2. Statement of Material Facts in Dispute Before the Trial Court. 
Facts Set Forth by Appellant 
The following factual statements are taken from Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. (Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 57-82), attached hereto as Exhibit A). 
1. Appellant is a general contractor on a construction project in Beaver County, Utah, 
owned and operated by Circle Four Farms (the "Project"). (Appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 60)). 
2. Appellee provided concrete work on the Project at the request of Precise Concrete, a 
subcontractor on the Project. (Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 60)). 
3. Precise failed to pay Appellee for work and supplies provided on the Project. 
(Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 
60)). 
4. Discussions and negotiations were held between Appellee and Appellant regarding the 
nonpayment by Precise. Due to a pending financial transaction, Circle Four and Appellant wanted 
to avoid the filing of a mechanic's lien upon the Project. (Appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 60)). 
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5. In order to avoid the filing of a the mechanic's lien, the parties discussed an 
arrangement whereby certain funds would be escrowed by Appellant on certain conditions. 
(Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 
60); see also Affidavit of Terry Weaver, at \\ 5-7, (R. 93), attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
6. The discussions regarding the terms of such an arrangement began between Mr. Wayne 
Smith, acting for Appellee, and Mr. Terry Weaver, acting for Appellant. Mr. Weaver and Mr. 
Smith discussed the various points to be included in any such agreement by telephone on or about 
November 6, 1995. The discussions between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith were followed by a 
confirmation memo sent to Mr. Smith by Mr. Weaver on November 7. (Affidavit of Weaver, at 
Vf 7-8, (R. 92-93); Confirmation Memo (R. 72), attached hereto as Exhibit D). 
7. On the following day, November 8, 1995, Mr. Smith contacted Mr. Solt, Chief 
Financial Officer of Appellant. Mr. Smith supplied Mr. Solt, by fax, with proposed escrow 
instructions, and with a proposed agreement (the "Formalization Agreement") prepared by 
Western's attorney, presumable to carry into effect the discussions held the day before. (Affidavit 
of Ronald Solt, (R. 89-91), attached as Exhibit C; Formalization Agreement (R. 73-78), attached 
hereto as Exhibit E). 
8. In the conversation on November 8, 1995, Mr. Smith advised Mr. Solt that Appellant 
was required to sign the Formalization Agreement and the Escrow Agreement and deposit the 
funds that day, or Western Rock would file its lien. (Affidavit of Solt, at \ 4. (R. 62)). 
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9. The Formalization Agreement contained additional terms which were not included in 
the prior discussions of the parties, and which were not included in the memo of November 7, 
1995, or terms different than those in the discussions and the Confirmation Memo. The applicable 
paragraphs, with the additional and different terms highlighted, all of which are substantial and 
material, are quoted from the Formalization Agreement as follows: 
1. On or before 5:00 p.m. on November 8,1995, Tri-County shall cause to be 
deposited in an interest-bearing account the sum of One Hundred Eighty-five Thousand 
Three Hundred Seventeen and 26/100 Dollars ($185,317.26). 
2. It is expressly understood that performance by the escrow agent of its duty to 
make the disbursement described above is conditioned only and exclusively upon the 
expiration of the six-month period. There shall be no other condition relating to 
disbursement from escrow. 
4. Western Rock shall attempt to collect the Precise account indebtedness from 
Precise Concrete. Western Rock's efforts to do so shall be solely and exclusively 
determined and governed by Western Rock's own discretion. Accordingly, Western 
Rock shall not be required to pursue judicial action, nor formal proceedings of any kind; 
but rather may choose to merely conduct informal negotiations in its attempt to collect the 
indebtedness. In sum, the efforts to be made and/or methods to be used by Western Rock 
in this regard shall be the sole and exclusive prerogative of Western Rock. 
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5. Tri-County expressly acknowledges that Precise Concrete may assert that the 
sums owed by Western Rock on the Precise account are incorrect or inaccurate, or that the 
labor, services or materials, or some portion thereof, supplied by Western Rock were 
defective. Notwithstanding any such assertion, and whether it be proven accurate or not, 
Tri-County hereby waives any claims, rights, defenses or causes of action it may have 
to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds be paid by Tri-County 
pursuant to this agreement. 
(R. 61-63). 
10. In the discussions on November 8, 1995, Mr. Solt attempted to persuade Mr. Smith 
to allow additional time to check with counsel and to otherwise analyze the Formalization 
Agreement and the escrow instructions. No time was allowed. Mr. Smith told Mr. Solt that if 
the escrow instructions and Formalization Agreement were not signed that day and the funds 
deposited, that a mechanic's lien would be filed. (Affidavit of Solt, at f 8. (R. 63)). 
11. Finally, after considerable negotiations, Mr. Solt and Mr. Smith agreed that the funds 
would be deposited, but that it would be done merely as a showing of good faith and without 
commitment of the parties. In that discussion, Mr. Smith agreed that he would not file a 
mechanic's lien. Mr. Solt agreed that he would deposit the funds and sign the escrow 
instructions, but that the escrow instructions would not be effective until the parties finalized the 
terms of the Formalization Agreement itself. (Affidavit of Solt, at J 9. (R. 63)). 
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12. To confirm this understanding, Mr. Solt sent a letter to Mr. Smith confirming the 
following: 
Confirming our conversation of today, I have executed a wire 
transfer to Southern Utah Title Company, through Sun Capital 
Bank. I have also returned to you via fax the escrow instructions 
pending finalization of the original agreement. I will forward a 
copy of the proposed changes as soon as I have them worked out. 
(Affidavit of Solt, at \ 10, (R. 63); Letter from Solt to Smith (R. 82), attached hereto as Exhibit 
F). 
13. Thereafter, the parties continued to negotiate, by themselves and through their 
attorneys, in an attempt to complete the Formalization Agreement. The contract was never 
reached. The draft agreement attached to Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Attached hereto as Exhibit G) represents several drafts whereby 
the parties attempted to finalize the terms of the agreement, which they were unable to do. 
(Affidavit of Solt, at 5 12. (R. 64). 
Statement of Material Faett in Pispme Pefore the Trial Court 
Because it is important for this Court to understand just how many material facts where 
in dispute before the trial court, and remain in dispute, Appellant sets forth the following disputed 
facts. 
1. Appellee claimed in its summary judgment action that the parties entered into an 
agreement on or about November 7, 1995. (R. 17). Appellant countered that the parties had only 
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begun negotiations for an agreement and that they had not entered into an agreement on or about 
November 7, 1995, and that this was a dispute as to a material fact. (R. 58). In support of this 
claim, Appellant submitted a sworn statement from Appellant's President, Terry Weaver, that 
stated, in pertinent part: 
8. The memo contains a reference that the attorney for 
Western Rock is to prepare escrow documents. It was my intention 
at the time that the terms discussed would not be binding upon 
either party until the escrow documents had been prepared by the 
attorney for [Appellee], reviewed by us and our attorney, and 
signed by the parties. This was specifically discussed by Mr. Smith 
and myself in our telephone conversation and we agreed that neither 
party would be bound until the final documents had been prepared. 
See Affidavit of Terry Weaver, at f^ 8. (R. 94). This single sworn statement was sufficient to 
create a dispute as to a material fact and to overcome Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Appellee claimed in its summary judgment action that pursuant to the alleged 
agreement, Appellee agreed to forebear filing a mechanic's lien upon the Project and to use its 
best effort to collect money owed to Appellee from Precise. (R. 18). Appellant countered that 
there was a material issue of fact in dispute as to the negotiations and ultimate terms of the alleged 
agreement. (R. 58). In support of this claim, Appellant submitted sworn statements from Mr. 
Weaver and Appellant's Chief Financial Officer, Ronald Stolt, that stated, in pertinent part: 
Terry Weaver: 
8. The memo contains a reference that the attorney for 
Western Rock is to prepare escrow documents. It was my intention 
at the time that the terms discussed would not be binding upon 
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either party until the escrow documents had been prepared by the 
attorney for [Appellee], reviewed by us and our attorney, and 
signed by the parties. This was specifically discussed by Mr. Smith 
and myself in our telephone conversation and we agreed that neither 
party would be bound until the final documents had been prepared. 
9. The following day, on November 8, 1995, I became 
aware that Western Rock had submitted to Tri-County for approval 
and signature the escrow documents which were discussed. This is 
consistent with the agreement reached between myself and Mr. 
Smith; that is, that the documents would be prepared and submitted 
for signature before the funds were paid. 
10. I have subsequently reviewed the documents which 
were prepared and submitted by Western Rock and find that they 
are inconsistent with the terms discussed between myself and Mr. 
Smith in the following particulars: 
A. The required payment of the funds within 
just a few hours. Mr. Smith and I did not discuss 
the exact amount of time that would be needed, but 
I do not believe that a few hours on the following 
day is a reasonable time. 
B. There was no waiver or release of 
Western Rock by Tri-County discussed as set forth 
in the proposed agreement. 
C. We specifically discussed that Western 
Rock would use its best efforts to aggressively 
collect from Precise. The agreement as submitted 
provides that Western Rock may use whatever 
efforts it chooses, presumably including no efforts at 
all, to collect from Precise. 
See Affidavit of Weaver, at f f 8-10. (R. 93-94). 
Ronald spit: 
4. After reviewing the documents, Mr. Wayne Smith and 
I had a telephone conversation. Mr. Smith was in Utah. I was in 
Pennsylvania. Mr. Smith advised me that unless Tri-County signed 
the documents immediately, as drafted, Western Rock intended to 
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file a mechanic's lien. I expressed objection to this, stating that 
Tri-County needed time to consult with its attorneys and to review 
the documents in detail. At the time I did not know the specifics of 
the terms discussed between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith the day 
before. 
5. Initially, Mr. Smith remained firm in his position that the 
documents had to be signed and returned, and the funds paid, that 
day. 
6. I contacted our attorney. Because he was in another 
meeting, I only had the chance to talk to him briefly and he only 
had the opportunity to review the documents briefly. 
7. After the discussions with our attorney, I again contacted 
Mr. Smith and explained to him the objections which I had to the 
documents. Those objections included the following: 
A. Tri-County objected to the release clause 
contained in the documents. 
B. Tri-County objected to the fact that Western 
Rock could unilaterally decide what efforts, if any, 
it wanted to expend in pursuing Precise Concrete. 
C. We did not have sufficient time to review the 
agreement. 
D. The agreement was couched in the terms of 
payment to Western Rock, rather than as a reserve 
deposit. 
E. The agreement eliminated the mutuality of 
performance. 
8. Mr. Smith continued to insist that the funds had to be 
paid that day, and that the documents had to be signed. I continued 
to insist that we would not sign the documents as drafted. 
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the funds 
into escrow, and to sign the escrow agreement with Southern Utah 
Title Company. As Mr. Smith and I discussed, this was done as a 
show of good faith but was not intended to be a final agreement of 
the parties since the terms of the agreement had not been reached. 
See Affidavit of Ronald Solt, at \\ 4-9. (R. 89-90). 
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These sworn statements were sufficient to create a dispute as to several material facts and 
to overcome Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that as a demonstration of the 
existence of the agreement, Appellant placed $185,317.26 in an interest-bearing escrow account, 
the terms of the alleged agreement were consistent with the Confirmation Memo. (R. 18) 
Appellant countered that the parties never reached an agreement and that the money was deposited 
only as a show of good faith while the parties continued the ultimate terms of the escrow 
agreement. (R. 58). In support of these claims, Appellant submitted the sworn statement from 
Mr. Solt as set forth in the preceding paragraph, which statement also included the following: 
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the funds 
into escrow, and to sign the escrow agreement with Southern Utah 
Title Company. As Mr. Smith and I discussed, this was done as a 
show of good faith but was not intended to be a final agreement of 
the parties since the terms of the agreement had not been reached. 
10. I signed the escrow agreement, I deposited the funds by 
wire transfer, and I sent a letter to Mr. Smith indicating that all of 
this was done pending finalizing the final terms of the agreement. 
A copy of my letter to Mr. Smith is attached hereto as Exhibit A 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
See Affidavit of Solt, at f f 4-10 (R. 89-90). 
These sworn statements were sufficient to create a dispute as to a material fact and to 
overcome Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that the terms of the alleged 
agreement were consistent with the Confirmation Memo. Appellant countered that the parties had 
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not reached an agreement and that it did not intend the contents of the Confirmation Memo to be 
anything more than a step in the negotiation process and not a final and binding agreement 
between the parties. In support of these claims, Appellant submitted sworn statements from Mr. 
Weaver and Mr. Stolt, as set forth above and in their affidavits. (R. 58). These sworn statements 
were sufficient to create a dispute as to a material fact and to overcome Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
5. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that the parties signed an escrow 
agreement. (R. 19). Appellant agreed that an escrow agreement was prepared and signed, but 
asserted that there were material facts in dispute surrounding the signing of the escrow agreement. 
(R. 58). Specifically, the escrow agreement was accompanied by a document entitled Agreement 
that was also intended to be signed by the parties and was to be an integrated companion document 
to the escrow agreement. (R. 58). The accompanying agreement (referred to by Appellee and 
hereinafter as the "Formalization Agreement") contained terms and conditions that were not 
acceptable to Appellant and that were not part of the parties' negotiations. (R. 58-59). In support 
of these claims, Appellant submitted sworn statements contained in Mr. Solt's affidavit as set forth 
above. See Affidavit of Solt, at S% 4-10 (R. 89-90). Again, these sworn statements were 
sufficient to overcome Appellee's motion for summary judgment. 
6. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that the Formalization Agreement 
embodied the terms and conditions of the agreement reached by the parties as a result their oral 
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discussions. (R. 19-20). Appellant countered that the Formalization Agreement contained several 
additional terms that were never part of the discussions and negotiations between the parties. (R. 
59). In support of these claims, Appellant submitted the sworn statements contained in Mr. Stolt's 
affidavit as set forth above. (R. 88-91). These sworn statements were sufficient to overcome 
Appellee's motion for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
This Court is called upon in this context to decide only whether the trial court erred in 
determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact. It is not this Court's role to rule 
on the merits of the facts alleged by either party, only to determine whether the facts as alleged 
have created a genuine issue of material fact. This Court owes no deference to the trial court's 
ruling in a summary judgment action. One sworn statement under oath that creates a genuine 
issue of material fact, is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. In the present case, 
Appellant submitted numerous statements sworn to under oath demonstrating that there were 
genuine issues of material fact with respect both to the alleged agreement as well as to the terms 
and conditions of the alleged agreement. Therefore, there were numerous genuine issues of 
material fact and the trial court erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II 
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As demonstrative of the above point, is the fact that there was no meeting of the minds or 
mutual assent of the parties with respect to the alleged agreement or any terms or conditions 
thereof. This is evident both from the writings of the parties as well as the sworn statements 
submitted by the parties in the summary judgment action. These writings and statements clearly 
demonstrate that the parties did not reach an agreement and that Appellant believed at all times 
that it was engaged only in negotiations and that it would not be bound by any terms arising out 
of the negotiations without its consent to be bound thereby. Because there was no meeting of the 
minds or mutual assent of the parties, there could be no agreement. Thus, there were significant 
and numerous genuine issues of material fact before the trial court including the most fundamental 
question of all~whether the parties actually formed an agreement. Appellee maintained that the 
parties had reached an agreement. Appellant submitted testimony sworn to under oath from two 
of its officers involved in the negotiations indicating that they did not reach an agreement but were 
only engaged in preliminary discussions and negotiations. This is a classic genuine issue of 
material fact. Therefore, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact and the trial court 
erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Ill 
Appellee asserts that the parties were bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the 
Confirmation Memo. Appellee asserts that the Confirming Memo is evidence that the parties had 
reached an agreement. However, on the very day following the Confirmation Memo, Appellee 
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sent to Appellant the Formalization Agreement and demanded that it be signed by Appellant. The 
Formalization Agreement contained numerous terms and conditions that were neither part of the 
Confirmation Memo nor the parties discussions and negotiations. Under law, the Formalization 
Agreement, with terms and conditions that differed from the Confirming Memo, is clear evidence 
that no agreement had been reached between the parties and that they were still in the negotiation 
process. These two documents demonstrate that there were genuine issues of material fact before 
the trial. Therefore, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact and the trial court erred 
in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
IV 
Appellant argued before the trial court that Appellee should be estopped from enforcing 
the Confirming Memo because of its express rejection of the Confirming Memo in the 
Formalization Agreement. The underlying argument here is that because there was a genuine 
issue of material fact, generated in part because of Appellee's rejection of the Confirming Memo, 
Appellee should be estopped from enforcing the Confirming Memo. Additionally, because 
estoppel is highly factual in nature and is not easily subject to disposition in a summary judgment 
proceeding. Therefore, there were genuine issues of material fact and the trial court erred in 




APPELLANT MET ITS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING 
THE EXISTENCE OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This Court should keep in mind that it is not necessary for Appellant, in this context, to 
prevail on the merits of legal arguments and analysis with respect to its underlying claims and 
defenses before the trial court. It is likewise not even necessary that Appellant somehow prove 
its facts by a preponderance of the evidence, which Appellant was not afforded the opportunity 
to do. Additionally, it is not even necessary for Appellant to demonstrate that it will prevail at 
trial on the merits of its claims and defenses-this would be an irrelevant consideration for this 
Court in this context. It is only necessary that Appellant demonstrate that there was and is a 
genuine issue of material fact. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 768 P.2d at 957. If Appellant carries this 
burden, and demonstrates that one single material fact is in dispute, this Court is mandated by law 
to reverse the summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for whatever proceedings 
the trial court and the parties deem necessary and appropriate. Id. 
This Court should also keep in mind that "[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a 
material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding the entry of 
summary judgment." Id. Additionally, this Court must review all relevant facts, and all 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the losing party-Appellant. 
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Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 460. This has been interpreted to mean that this Court must resolve all 
questions of doubt in favor of Appellant. Draper Bank & Trust Co. v. Lawson, 675 P.2d 1174 
(Utah 1983) 
Without addressing the merits of the opposing claims at this point, the pedagogical and 
laborious factual exercise set forth above in this Brief, clearly demonstrates that there was at least 
one, and in fact many, genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded entry of summary 
judgment. The most ominous and certainly dispositive genuine issue of material fact is with 
respect to whether the parties actually entered into an agreement or whether they were merely 
engaged in negotiations with the hope of reaching an agreement. The following summary of 
genuine issues of material fact demonstrates this point: 
1. Appellee claimed that the parties reached a binding agreement. 
Appellant submitted statements made under oath from its President and Chief 
Financial Officer, both of whom were participating in the negotiations, 
demonstrating that Appellant did not believe that the parties had reached an 
agreement, but, at most, that the parties had engaged in the negotiation process 
with the hope that they might at some point settle their dispute with each other.3 
3
 This issue revolves around whether there was a meeting of the minds between the 
parties. This determination has in fact not yet been determined. However, it is not necessary for 
Appellant to prove that there was not a meeting of the minds. It is only necessary for Appellant 
to demonstrate, which it has done, that there was a material factual dispute with respect to whether 
there was a meeting of the minds. 
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Appellant therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material 
fact and the entry of summary judgment was improper. Id. 
2. Appellee alleged that there were certain terms and conditions that were 
material to the alleged agreement. Appellant submitted statements made under oath 
from its President and Chief Financial Officer, both of whom were participating 
in the negotiations, demonstrating not only that there was a material fact in dispute 
as to the existence of the alleged agreement, but also as to the terms of alleged 
agreement. Simply put, Appellant submitted sworn statements placing the alleged 
terms of the agreement in dispute.4 Appellant therefore carried its burden of 
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact and the entry of summary judgment 
was improper. Id. 
3. Appellee alleged that Appellant's act of placing $185,317.85 in an 
interest-bearing escrow account demonstrated the existence of the agreement. 
Appellant submitted statements made under oath from its Chief Financial Officer, 
who was participating in the negotiations, that the money was not deposited as a 
result of an agreement, but in actuality because of duress and threats by Appellee 
and in response to the duress and threats as a show of good faith by Appellant 
4
 Appellant notes that if there is a genuine material factual issue over the alleged terms 
of the agreement, under general contract law as discussed below in the text, there was not a 
meeting of the minds and, a fortiori, no agreement. 
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while the parties continued to negotiate towards and agreement. Appellant 
therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact and 
the entry of summary judgment was improper. Id. 
4. Appellee claimed that the terms of the alleged agreement ultimately 
reached by the parties was consistent with what it referred to as the Confirmation 
Memo. Appellant submitted statements made under oath from its President and 
Chief Financial Officer, both of whom were participating in the negotiations, 
demonstrating that the Appellant intended the Confirmation Memo to be nothing 
more than a step in the negotiation process and not a final and binding agreement 
between the parties. Appellant therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a 
genuine issue of material fact and the entry of summary judgment was improper. 
Id. 
5. Appellee claimed that the parties signed an escrow agreement and that 
this demonstrated that the parties had reached an overall agreement. Appellant 
submitted statements made under oath from its Chief Financial Officer, who was 
participating in the negotiations, demonstrating that the escrow agreement was 
accompanied by a document entitled "Formalization Agreement" that Appellee 
demanded that Appellant sign but which contained terms and conditions that were 
not acceptable to Appellant and that were not part of the parties' negotiations. 
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Appellant therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material 
fact and the entry of summary judgment was improper. Id. 
There is no question that Appellant carried its burden in demonstrating that there were 
genuine issues of material fact precluding the entry of summary judgment. In this case it was the 
ultimate material fact that was and is in dispute-whether the parties actually reached and entered 
into an agreement. Even if there is a question as to whether Appellant has demonstrated the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the outcome is the same. This Court must resolve 
all such questions in favor of Appellant and reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand this 
case for further proceedings. 
II 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS OR MUTUAL 
ASSENT AND THEREFORE THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT 
AND THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As a preliminary matter, and at the risk of being repetitive, it is not incumbent upon this 
Court to determine whether there actually was or was not a meeting of the minds or mutual assent. 
On the contrary, this Court's job is far easier. This Court must only determine whether there was 
a genuine issue of material fact with respect to a meeting of the minds or mutual assent. Again, 
if there is any question as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact over these issues, 
Appellant wins. That is, this Court must resolve all such questions or doubt in favor of Appellant 
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which leaves only one course of action-a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 460. The following discussion and analysis clearly demonstrates that there 
were genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the parties had a meeting of the minds 
or whether their was mutual assent to the alleged agreement. 
The body of law on mutual assent (meeting of the minds) is vast, and it is sometimes 
unclear. However, there are several general principals which can be applied to the analysis of this 
case. The fundamental principal which controls in this case is that there must be mutual assent 
or meeting of the minds on all essential elements or terms in order to form a binding 
contract. Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis added); see also 17 
Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts § 26 (1991). It is also fundamental that there can be no contract unless 
all of the parties involved intended to enter into a contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts § 26 
(1991). 
In the present case, as discussed in detail above, there was no mutual assent or a meeting 
of the minds on all essential elements or terms of the alleged agreement. Consequently, there 
could be no agreement. Vasels, 740 P.2d at 1377-1378. Not only was there no meeting of the 
minds or mutual assent between the adverse parties, but even Appellee admits that there was not 
a formal agreement reached between the two parties. Wayne Smith, Appellee's Cedar City 
Manager, testified in one part of his affidavit that there was an agreement reached (and implicitly 
that he intended to form a contract), and yet in the very same affidavit he acknowledges that "the 
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agreement was to be more formally set forth in a future document." (R. 36-39). As discussed 
above and as will be more folly discussed below, the "future document" was vastly different than 
the alleged agreement terms specified in the Confirmation Memo—this is sufficient to show that 
there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent. 
In Crismon v. Western Company of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987), the 
parties stated in correspondence that they would enter into a lease agreement in accordance with 
the terms generally specified therein. The court held that the correspondence, even though it 
expressed the terms of the leases, did not constitute a contract between the parties because they 
contemplated that another agreement to formalize the transaction would be prepared. The Court 
stated: 
Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not formed 
without a meeting of the minds. [Contractual mutual assent 
requires asset by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so 
that their minds meet as to all the terms. Determining whether the 
specific terms omitted were essential to the agreement requires an 
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances under 
which the agreement was entered into. 
In this case, the language in Eppes1 January 11 letter 
indicates that the parties were still negotiating. The letter states 
that Western's legal department would be sending a prepared 
lease. That statement indicates that both parties understood that a 
binding contract would be entered into in the future. Subsequent 
correspondence between the parties also demonstrates that the 
January 11 letter evidenced preliminary negotiations. 
Finally, the subsequent leases exchanged by the parties 
demonstrate that there was no meeting of the minds. Eppes sent 
Crismon a lease which Crismon rejected by sending back a lease 
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with different terms with regard to term, rent, maintenance, 
insurance and default. The parties' exchange of proposed leases 
clearly demonstrates that they did not have a meeting of the 
minds as to all of the essential terms of the lease. 
Id. at 1221-1222 (emphasis added). 
Crismon case is substantively similar to the present case. In both cases, the writings 
expressed that a subsequent document would be prepared. In both cases, one of the parties 
subsequently prepared a detailed agreement, which included terms and conditions which were not 
covered in the original negotiations or correspondence. In both cases, the parties subsequently 
exchanged several drafts of the anticipated final agreement. In Crismon, the Court held that the 
preliminary correspondence did not constitute an agreement. In this case, there is at least an issue 
of fact as to whether there was a meeting of the minds. 
There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended an 
agreement based on the Confirmation Memo and discussions. Appellant claims that there was an 
agreement reached on November 7, 1995, and that the agreement is memorialized by the written 
Confirmation Memo sent from Mr. Weaver to Mr. Smith. Mr. Weaver, on the other hand, states 
in sworn testimony that there was to be no agreement until the written document to be provided 
by Appellee's attorney had been prepared, reviewed and signed by both parties. See Affidavit of 
Weaver, at S 8. (R. 93-94). The Confirmation Memo states that "[Appellee] counsel will draw 
up escrow document and forward to [Appellant]". (R. 72). Mr. Weaver's intention was that until 
the escrow documents were finalized, there was not an agreement that would bind either party. 
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See Affidavit of Weaver, at *[ 8. (R. 93-94). Appellee's own conduct substantiates Mr. Weaver's 
position. The day after the Confirmation Memo, documents were prepared and submitted to 
Appellant for signature. If the contract was intended to be memorialized in the confirming memo, 
when and why, then, did the Appellee prepare an agreement significantly different from the 
confirming memo? Appellee must have considered that negotiations were still open because the 
document contained many additional terms beyond those set forth in the alleged confirming memo. 
Some of the additional terms and conditions were substantial and significantly altered the rights 
of the parties. (R. 60-61). The law on the point is clear and solidly supports Appellant's 
position. 
[T]he fact that parties to negotiations contemplated the drawing and 
execution of a formal written contract is regarded in numerous cases 
as evidence that they intended the prior oral or informal agreement, 
by correspondence or otherwise, to be merely tentative and not 
final. Indeed, this circumstance has been considered as "strong 
evidence" that the parties did not intend that the negotiations should 
amount to an agreement prior to the execution of the formal 
writing. 
17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 38 (1991). 
The fact that several drafts of the Formalization Agreement containing substantially 
differing terms were submitted by the parties must, under law, be considered strong evidence that 
there was not an agreement in the first place, but merely negotiations, thus raising a genuine issue 
of material fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Crismon, 742 P.2d at 1222. If nothing else, 
it clearly and positively demonstrates that there were genuine issues of material fact with respect 
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to the alleged agreement and that the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion for summary 
judgment. 
i n 
APPELLEE'S ACTIONS ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THE 
CONFIRMATION MEMO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE 
WAS NO AGREEMENT AND THAT THERE WERE 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT SURROUNDING THE TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS OF THE ALLEGED 
Appellee argued below that there was not a genuine issue of material fact with respect to 
the agreement that was embodied in the Confirming Memo. However, Appellee's actions on the 
very next day completely undercut Appellee's position and just as clearly demonstrate that there 
were considerable genuine issues of material fact with respect to the agreement and the terms 
thereof. Specifically, the Formalization Agreement sent by Appellee to Appellant on the day 
following the Confirming Memo was totally inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo and 
contained numerous terms and conditions that had not been part of the parties communications or 
negotiations. The proposed Formalization Agreement contained the following significant 
provisions which were not part of the Confirmation Memo: 
A. The Formalization Agreement imposed a time limited in paragraph la of less 
than four hours. Since there was no time specified in the Confirmation Memo, the law 
will imply a reasonable time. There is an issue of fact as to whether four hours is a 
reasonable time. This was not part of the Confirmation Memo, the parties' 
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communications or negotiations. See Affidavit of Weaver, at \ 10 (R. 94); See Affidavit 
of Solt, at 1 7 (R. 89-90). 
B. The Formalization Agreement contained a complete waiver by Appellant of all 
defenses to the quality of the materials, and "any claims, rights, defenses or cause of 
action it may have to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds." This was 
not part of the Confirmation Memo, the parties' communications or negotiations. See 
Affidavit of Weaver, at \ 10 (R. 94); See Affidavit of Solt, at \ 7 (R. 89-90). 
C. The Confirmation Memo requires Appellee to use "its best efforts to collect 
monies owed." The Formalization Agreement, on the other hand, is essentially illusory 
on the point, granting to Appellee the right to use whatever efforts it chooses, or no efforts 
at all, in "the sole and exclusive prerogative of [Appellee]." This was not part of the 
Confirmation Memo, the parties' communications or negotiations. See Affidavit of 
Weaver, at 110 (R. 94); See Affidavit of Solt, at 1 7 (R. 89-90). 
D. The Formalization Agreement, in Section lc, removes the mutuality of the 
obligation contained in the Confirmation Memo by providing that the funds will be paid 
to ^AppeUee} at the end of six (6) months vrithout regatd to the performance by t Appellee}. 
This was not part of the Confirmation Memo, the parties' communications or negotiations. 
See Affidavit of Weaver, at \ 10 (R. 94); See Affidavit of Solt, at 1 7 (R. 89-90). 
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These differences are so substantial and so materially different from the Confirmation 
Memo and the parties' communications and negotiations, that Appellant could not, in good faith, 
agree to them. After considerable discussion, and after direct threats by Appellee that it would 
file a mechanic's lien if Appellant would not immediately sign the agreement, the parties finally 
agreed to convey the funds into escrow pending finalizing the agreement itself. See Affidavit of 
Solt, at % 9 (R. 90). By imposing conditions beyond those contained in the Confirmation Memo, 
the parties' communications and negotiations, and by forcing Appellant to act in a manner directly 
inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo, if there ever was a contract between them for the 
escrow of the funds, it was repudiated by Appellee and the funds paid were under the separate and 
distinct agreement which was reached the following day; that is, that the funds would be conveyed 
into escrow in good faith pending the finalizing of the formal agreement. At the very least, the 
terms and conditions in the Formalization Agreement and the Confirming Memo demonstrate that 
the parties never had a meeting of the minds or mutu£T assent to the agreement or the terms 
thereof and that there are significant genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, the trial court 
erred in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment. 
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IV 
THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL IS HIGHLY FACTUAL IN 
NATURE AND IS NOT READILY SUBJECT TO 
DISPOSITION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ESPECIALLY 
WHERE, AS IN THIS CASE, NUMEROUS MATERIAL 
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN IN DISPUTE 
Appellant argued below that, based on the events discussed in the previous section, 
Appellee should be estopped from now trying to enforce the Confirmation Memo-a document that 
it rejected when it submitted to Appellant the Formalization Agreement containing significant and 
material differences. Estoppel is by nature highly factually dependent and is not readily subject 
to disposition on summary judgment. See United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First 
National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982); Ehlers & Ehlers v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 792 
(Utah App. 1991). This is especially true where, as in this case, there are serious and numerous 
genuine issues of material fact surrounding the underlying reasons that Appellant is requesting 
Appellee to be estopped. 
Estoppel arises when one of the parties changes position or adopts a cause of action in 
reliance on the representations of another. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 
688, 691 (Utah 1985). In this case, the funds were paid by Appellant, not in accordance with the 
Confirmation Memo, but with the clear understanding that there was no contract and that there 
would be subsequent discussions. See Affidavit of Solt, at f^ 9 (R. 90). Therefore, the trial court 
erred in granting Appellee' motion for summary judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, there are numerous genuine issues of material fact 
precluding summary judgment. The trial court therefore erred in granting Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the fact of the genuine issues of material fact. This Court should therefore 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 1997. 
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SYSTEMS, INC., a Pennsylvania 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 95-CV-115 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The Defendant above named, by and through counsel, submits its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. This memorandum is submitted 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 4-501(2) of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Defendant 
submits the following statement of material facts which the Defendant contends to be at issue. 
S7 
The material facts are numbered by paragraph to correspond to the statement of material facts 
contained in the Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
beginning at page 2. 
8. There is a material issue of fact as to whether there was an agreement entered into 
between Tri-County and Western Rock on or about November 6-7, 1995. Affidavit of Terry 
Weaver, 1 8. 
9. There is an issue of fact as to the negotiations, and ultimate terms, of the alleged 
contract. Weaver Affid., 11 8-10; Affidavit of Ronald Solt, 11 4-9. 
11. There was never a final contract reached, because the funds were deposited only as 
a show of good faith while the parties continued to negotiate towards the ultimate terms of the 
escrow. Solt Affid., 1 4-10. Thus, there is an issue of fact as to whether there was an 
agreement, and if there was an agreement, what the terms thereof were. 
12. There is an issue of fact as to whether there was an agreement, and if so, what were 
the terms of the agreement. Paragraph 12 of the Statement of Facts in the Plaintiffs 
memorandum simply recites the terms of the Confirmation Memo. Weaver Affid.; Solt Affid. 
13. As to paragraph 13, the Defendant agrees that an escrow agreement was prepared 
and signed, but believes there are other additional facts related thereto. The escrow agreement 
was indeed prepared by Western Rock's counsel and forwarded to Tri-County. However, it was 
included with a document entitled Agreement which was also intended to be signed by the parties 
and was to be an integrated companion document with the escrow instructions. The Agreement, 
reference herein as the Formalization Agreement to be consistent with the Plaintiffs 
2 
memorandum, contained terms and conditions which were not acceptable to Tri-County* Thus, 
there are issues of fact as to whether there was a contract, and if there was, what the terms of 
the contract were. Id. 
14. There is an issue of fact as to the form and effect of the Formalization Agreement 
referred to in paragraph 14 of the Plaintiffs memorandum. Plaintiffs counsel characterized it 
as "setting forth in greater detail the operative terms of settlement." As a matter of fact, it 
contains several additional terms that were never included in the discussions, and the Plaintiff 
threatened to file its mechanic's lien if the Formalization Agreement was not signed. Thus, 
there is an issue of fact as to the terms, nature and effect of the terms submitted in the 
Formalization Agreement. Id. 
15. There is an issue of fact as to the proposed terms of the Formalization Agreement, 
the relationship between the Formalization Agreement and the other discussions and 
correspondence between the parties, and the conduct of the parties at the time the Formalization 
Agreement and escrow agreement were submitted. Id. 
16. There is an issue of fact as to the proposed terms of the Formalization Agreement, 
the relationship between the Formalization Agreement and the other discussions and 
correspondence between the parties, and the conduct of the parties at the time the Formalization 
Agreement and escrow agreement were submitted. Id. 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant submits the following statement of facts, as it sees them. This statement 
of facts includes facts which are not disputed, the Defendant's version of the facts which are 
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disputed, and additional facts which are not referenced at all by the Plaintiff, all of which the 
Defendant believes to be material. 
1. Tri-County is a general contractor on a construction project in Beaver County, Utah, 
owned and operated by Circle Four Farms (the "Project"). Plaintiffs Memorandum, Statement 
of Material Facts, 1 1. 
2. Western Rock Products provided concrete work on the Project at the request of 
Precise Concrete, a subcontractor on the Project. Id., 11 2-5. 
3. For the purposes of this motion, Defendant agrees that there is a balance owing to 
Western Rock by Precise in the amount of One Hundred Ninety Thousand Three Hundred 
Thirty-two and 37/100 Dollars ($190,332.37). Id. , 1 5 . By admitting this fact for the purposes 
of this motion, the Defendant does not agree to be bound by this fact at any other point in the 
proceedings. 
4. There were negotiations held between Western Rock and Tri-County regarding the 
nonpayment by Precise. Due to a pending financial transaction, Circle Four and Tri-County did 
indeed wish to avoid the filing of a mechanic's lien upon the Project. Weaver Affid., 1 5. 
5. In order to avoid the filing of a the mechanic's lien, the parties discussed an 
arrangement whereby certain funds would be escrowed by Tri-County on certain conditions. 
Weaver Affid., 115-7. 
6. The discussions regarding the terms of such an arrangement began with Wayne Smith, 
acting for Western Rock, and Terry Weaver, acting for Tri-County. Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith 
discussed the various points to be included in any such agreement by telephone on or about 
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1995, or terms different than those in the discussions and the Confirmation Memo. The 
applicable paragraphs, with the additional and different terms highlighted, all of which are 
substantial and material, are quoted from the Formalization Agreement as follows: 
la. On or before 5:00p.m. on November 8, 1995, Tri-County shall cause to be 
deposited in an interest-bearing account the sum of One Hundred Eighty-five Thousand 
Three Hundred Seventeen and 26/100 Dollars ($185,317.26). 
2. It is expressly understood that performance by the escrow agent of its duty to 
make the disbursement described above is conditioned only and exclusively upon the 
expiration of the six-month period. There shall be no other condition relating to 
disbursement from escrow. 
4. Western Rock shall attempt to collect the Precise account indebtedness from 
Precise Concrete. Western Rock's efforts to do so shall be solely and exclusively 
determined and governed by Western Rock's own discretion. Accordingly, Western 
Rock shall not be required to pursue judicial action, nor formal proceedings of any kind; 
but rather may choose to merely conduct informal negotiations in its attempt to collect 
the indebtedness. In sum, the efforts to be made and/or methods to be used by Western 
Rock in this regard shall be the sole and exclusive prerogative of Western Rock. 
5. Tri-County expressly acknowledges that Precise Concrete may assert that the 
sums owed by Western Rock on the Precise account are incorrect or inaccurate, or that 
the labor, services or materials, or some portion thereof, supplied by Western Rock were 
defective. Notwithstanding any such assertion, and whether it be proven accurate or not, 
6 
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November 6, 1995. The discussions between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith were followed by a 
confirmation memo sent to Mr. Smith by Mr. Weaver on November 7 (the "Confirmation 
Memo"). A copy of the Confirmation Memo is attached to the Plaintiffs memorandum as 
Exhibit C, and is attached to this memorandum as Exhibit A. The confirmation memo contains 
several crucial points. Those dispute are quoted as follows: 
A. "Western shall use its best efforts to collect monies owed and resolve 
differences with Precise.M 
B. "Western agrees to provide internal documents to Tri-County regarding 
Precise account in order assist in concluding matters." 
C. "Western counsel will draw up escrow document and forward to Tri-County." 
7. On the following day, November 8, 1995, Wayne Smith contacted Ron Solt, Chief 
Financial Officer of Tri-County Confinement Systems, Inc. Mr. Smith supplied Mr. Solt, by 
fax, with proposed escrow instructions, and with a proposed agreement (the "Formalization 
Agreement") prepared by Western's attorney, presumable to carry into effect the discussions 
held the day before. A copy of the Formalization Agreement and the escrow instructions, as 
submitted, are attached hereto as Exhibits B and C, respectively. 
8. In the conversation on November 8, 1995, Mr. Smith advised Mr. Solt that Tri-
County was required to sign the Formalization Agreement and the Escrow Agreement and 
deposit the funds that day, or Western Rock would file its lien. Solt Affid., 1 4. 
9. The Formalization Agreement contained additional terms which were not included in 
the prior discussions of the parties, and which were not included in the memo of November 7, 
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Tri-County hereby waives any claims, rights, defenses or causes of action it may 
have to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds be paid by Tri-
County pursuant to this agreement. 
Each of the paragraphs set forth above are in addition to or different from the terms that were 
discussed between Mr. Smith and Mr. Weaver on the days before, and they substantially and 
materially alter the rights of the parties. 
10. In the discussions on November 8, 1995, Mr. Solt attempted to persuade Mr. Smith 
to allow additional time to check with counsel and to otherwise analyze the Formalization 
Agreement and the escrow instructions. No time was allowed. Mr. Smith told Mr. Solt that 
if the escrow instructions and Formalization Agreement were not signed that day and the funds 
deposited, that a mechanic's lien would be filed. Solt Affid., 1 8. 
11. Finally, after considerable negotiations, Mr. Solt and Mr. Smith agreed that the 
funds would be deposited, but that it would be done merely as a showing of good faith and 
without commitment of the parties. In that discussion, Mr. Smith agreed that he would not file 
a mechanic's lien. Mr. Solt agreed that he would deposit the funds and sign the escrow 
instructions, but that the escrow instructions would not be effective until the parties finalized the 
terms of the Formalization Agreement itself. Solt Affid., 1 9. 
12. To confirm this understanding, Mr. Solt sent a letter to Mr. Smith confirming the 
following: 
Confirming our conversation of today, I have executed a wire transfer to Southern 
Utah Title Company, through Sun Capital Bank, I have also returned to you via 
7 
fax the escrow instructions pending finalization of the original agreement. I will 
forward a copy of the proposed changes as soon as I have them worked out. 
A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated herein by this reference. 
SoltAffid., 1 10. 
13. Thereafter, the parties continued to negotiate, by themselves and through their 
attorneys, in an attempt to complete the Formalization Agreement. The contract was never 
reached. The draft attached as Exhibit E to the Plaintiffs memorandum represents several drafts 
whereby the parties attempted to finalize the terms of the agreement, which they were unable 
to do. SoltAffid., 1 12. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS OR MUTUAL ASSENT, AND 
THUS THERE WAS NO CONTRACT 
The body of law on mutual assent (meeting of the minds) is vast, and it is sometimes 
unclear. However, there are several general principals which can be applied to the analysis of 
this case. The fundamental principal which controls the issue is that there must be mutual assent 
or meeting of the minds on all essential elements or terms in order to form a binding contract. 
Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987); 17 Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts § 26 (1991). 
It is also fundamental that there can be no contract unless all of the parties involved intended to 
enter one. Id. §27. In the case at bar, there are issues of fact on both of these fundamental 
points. Wayne Smith has testified in affidavit that there was an agreement reached (and 
implicitly that he intended to form a contract). Yet in the very same affidavit he acknowledges 
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that "the agreement was to be more formally set forth in a future document." Smith Affid., 1 
17. As will be more fully discussed below, the "future document" was vastly different than the 
alleged agreement terms specified in the Confirmation Memo. 
Terry Weaver for Tri-County has testified in affidavit that there was no contract until the 
final documents were signed, and that the funds would not be paid until that point. Weaver 
Affid., 1 8. The Confirmation Memo was preliminary. In Crismon v. Western Company of 
North America, 742 P.2d 1219, the parties stated in correspondence that they would enter into 
a lease agreement in accordance with the terms specified. The court held that the 
correspondence, even though it expressed the terms of the leases, did not constitute a contract 
between the parties because they contemplated that another agreement to formalize the 
transaction would be prepared. The Court stated: 
Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not formed without a meeting 
of the minds. [Contractual mutual assent requires asset by all parties to the same 
thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms. Determining 
whether the specific terms omitted were essential to the agreement requires an 
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the 
agreement was entered into. 
In this case, the language in Eppes' January 11 letter indicates that the 
parties were still negotiating. The letter states that Western's legal 
department would be sending a prepared lease. That statement indicates that 
both parties understood that a binding contract would be entered into in the 
future. Subsequent correspondence between the parties also demonstrates 
that the January 11 letter evidenced preliminary negotiations. 
Finally, the subsequent leases exchanged by the parties demonstrate 
that there was no meeting of the minds. Eppes sent Crismon a lease which 
Crismon rejected by sending back a lease with different terms with regard to 
term, rent, maintenance, insurance and default. The parties' exchange of 
proposed leases clearly demonstrates that they did not have a meeting of the 
minds as to all of the essential terms of the lease. 
9 
Id. at 1221-1222. 
Note how many facts from the Crismon case are also present here. In both cases, the 
writings expressed that a subsequent document would be prepared. In both cases, one of the 
parties subsequently prepared a detailed agreement, which included terms and conditions which 
were not covered in the original correspondence. In both cases, the parties subsequently 
exchanged several drafts of the anticipated final agreement. In Crismon, the Court held that the 
preliminary correspondence did not constitute an agreement. In this case, there is at least an 
issue of fact as to whether there was a meeting of the minds. 
There is also an issue of fact as to whether the parties intended an agreement based on 
the Confirmation Memo and discussions. The Plaintiff claims that there was an agreement 
reached on November 7, 1995, and that the agreement is memorialized by the written 
Confirmation Memo sent from Terry Weaver to Wayne Smith. Terry Weaver, on the other 
hand, states that there was no agreement until the written document to be provided by the 
attorney for the Plaintiff had been prepared and signed. Weaver Affid. 1 8. The Confirmation 
Memo states this precisely as follows: 
Western counsel will draw up escrow document and forward to Tri-County. 
Mr. Weaver's intention was that until the escrow documents were finalized, there was not an 
agreement that would bind either party. Weaver Affid., t 8. The Plaintiffs own conduct 
substantiates Mr. Weaver's position. The next day documents were prepared and were 
submitted to Tri-County for signature. If the contract was intended to be memorialized in the 
confirming memo, when, then, did the Plaintiff prepare an agreement significantly different from 
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it? The Plaintiff must have considered that negotiations were still open because the document 
contained many additional terms beyond those set forth in the alleged confirming memo. Some 
of them were substantial and significantly altered the rights of the parties. See 11 6, 9, 
Defendant's Statement of Facts. The general law on the point solidly supports the Defendant's 
position. 
[Tjhe fact that parties to negotiations contemplated the drawing and execution of 
a formal written contract is regarded in numerous cases as evidence that they 
intended the prior oral or informal agreement, by correspondence or otherwise, 
to be merely tentative and not final. Indeed, this circumstance has been 
considered as "strong evidence" that the parties did not intend that the 
negotiations should amount to an agreement prior to the execution of the formal 
writing. 
17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 38 (1991). 
The fact that several drafts of the Formalization Agreement containing substantially 
differing terms were submitted by the parties may be considered as evidence that there was not 
an agreement in the first place, thus raising an issue of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. 
Crismon v. Western Company of North America, supra, at 1222. At root, whether there is or 
is not a contract depends on the intention of the parties. In this case, we have two parties whose 
intentions were different. Both of their intentions are sufficiently justified in the facts, and there 
is, therefore, an issue of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. 
POINT n 
IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT REACHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE CONFIRMATION MEMO, THAT AGREEMENT WAS REPUDIATED 
AND THE ESCROWED FUNDS WERE PAID PURSUANT TO ANOTHER 
AGREEMENT ENTERED THE FOLLOWING DAY 
11 
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Even if there was a contract based on the confirming memo, the circumstances of the 
following day completely changed that agreement. The Formalization Agreement submitted by 
the Plaintiff the following day was totally inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo. The 
proposed Formalization Agreement, which is set forth as Exhibit B to this memorandum, 
contained the following significant provisions which were not part of the confirming memo. 
A. The Formalization Agreement imposed a time limited in paragraph la of less 
than four hours. Since there was no time specified in the Confirmation Memo, the law 
will imply a reasonable time. There is an issue of fact as to whether four hours is a 
reasonable time. 
B. The Formalization Agreement contained a complete waiver by Tri-County of 
all defenses to the quality of the materials, and Many claims, rights, defenses or cause of 
action it may have to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds." 
C. The Confirmation Memo requires Western to use "its best efforts to collect 
monies owed." The Formalization Agreement, on the other hand, is essentially illusory 
on the point, granting to Western Rock the right to use whatever efforts it chooses, or 
no efforts at all, in "the sole and exclusive prerogative of Western Rock." 
D. The Formalization Agreement, in Section lc, removes the mutuality of the 
obligation contained in the Confirmation Memo by providing that the funds will be paid 
to Western Rock at the end of six (6) months without regard to the performance by 
Western Rock. 
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These differences are so substantial and so materially different from the confirming 
memo, that Tri-County would not agree to them. After considerable discussion, and after direct 
threats by Western Rock to file a mechanic's lien if Tri-County would not sign the agreement, 
the parties finally agreed to convey the funds into escrow pending finalizing the agreement itself. 
By imposing conditions beyond those contained in the Confirmation Memo, and by forcing Tri-
County to act in a manner directly inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo, if there ever was 
a contract between them for the escrow of the funds, it was repudiated by Western Rock and the 
funds paid were under the separate and distinct agreement which was reached the following day; 
that is, that the funds would be conveyed into escrow in good faith pending the finalizing of the 
formal agreement. 
As a general principle, where one party to a contract repudiates it or refuses to 
perform it, the other party is not obligated to perform his promise, and such 
nonperformance does not render the other party liable in damages. 
17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 704 (1991). In the Plaintiffs best case, there is an issue of fact 
as to the circumstances surrounding the payment into escrow on November 8, 1995, and the 
legal effect thereof. 
POINT in 
ESTOPPEL IS ALSO AN ISSUE OF FACT 
The Plaintiff should be estopped from enforcing the terms of the Confirmation Memo, 
if it constituted a contract, because of its actions on November 8. Estoppel arises when one of 
the parties changes position or adopts a cause of action in reliance on the representations of 
another. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985). In this 
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case, the funds were paid by Tri-County, not in accordance with the Confirmation Memo, but 
with the clear understanding that there was no contract and that there would be subsequent 
discussions. Solt Affid., ^ 9. Estoppel is an issue of fact. Ehlers & Ehlers v. Carbon County•, 
805 P.2d 789, 792 (Utah App. 1991). United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First 
National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982). There are issues of fact on this issue precluding 
summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many material issues of fact in this case. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be denied and the Court should be entitled to consider all of the evidence at 
a trial, to sort out the facts and apply the appropriate law. 
DATED this *f day of April, 1996. 
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
THtfMAS M. HIGI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the __f£^day of April, 1996, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Terry L. Wade, Esq. 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart 
P.O. Box 400 





THOMAS M. HIGBEE (1484) 
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84721 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 





SYSTEMS, INC., a Pennsylvania 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY WEAVER 
Civil No. 95-CV-115 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
Terry Weaver, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. This affiant is an individual residing in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. This affidavit is 
made upon this affiant's own personal knowledge. 
2. This affiant is the /r*i>/sn 7 of Tri-County Confinement Systems, Inc., a 
Pennsylvania corporation, doing business in Beaver County, Utah, and the Defendant herein. 
°l* 
3. On or about November 6, 1995, this affiant had a telephone conversation with Wayne 
Smith, on behalf of Western Rock Products, the Plaintiff herein. At the time of the 
conversation, this affiant was in the State of Pennsylvania at the business offices of Tri-County. 
Mr. Smith was in Utah, at the offices of Western Rock Products. 
4. The center topic of conversation was the balance which Western Rock Products 
claims is owed by Precise Concrete on a project located in Beaver County, Utah, known as the 
Circle Four Farms project. 
5. During the course of the conversation, the parties discussed several things related to 
that account. This affiant advised Mr. Smith that neither Tri-County nor Circle Four Farms 
wanted a mechanic's lien to be placed on the Circle Four Farms project because of pending 
financing. Mr. Smith expressed that he would refrain from filing a mechanic's lien if other 
security could be arranged. 
6. The discussions ended up with a tentative approval by Mr. Smith and myself which 
would prevent the filing of the mechanic's lien and at the same time protect the security position 
of Western Rock. 
7. The general terms of the conversation are set forth in the memorandum which I sent 
to Mr. Smith the following day, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
8. The memo contains a reference that the attorney for Western Rock is to prepare the 
escrow documents. It was my intention at the time that the terms discussed would not be 
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binding upon either party until the escrow documents had been prepared by the attorney for 
Western Rock, reviewed by us and our attorney, and signed by the parties. This was 
specifically discussed by Mr. Smith and myself in our telephone conversation and we agreed that 
neither party would be bound until the final documents had been prepared and signed. 
9. The following day, on November 8, 1995, I became aware that Western Rock had 
submitted to Tri-County for approval and signature the escrow documents which were discussed. 
This is consistent with the agreement reached between myself and Mr. Smith; that is, that the 
documents would be prepared and submitted for signature before the funds were paid. 
10. I have subsequently reviewed the documents which were prepared and submitted by 
Western Rock and find that they are inconsistent with the terms discussed between myself and 
Mr. Smith in the following particulars: 
A. The required payment of the funds within just a few hours. Mr. Smith and 
I did not discuss the exact amount of time that would be needed, but I do not believe that a few 
hours on the following day is a reasonable time. 
B. There was no waiver or release of Western Rock by Tri-County discussed as 
set forth in the proposed agreement. 
C. We specifically discussed that Western Rock would use its best efforts to 
aggressively collect from Precise. The agreement as submitted provides that Western Rock may 
use whatever efforts it chooses, presumably including no efforts at all, to collect from Precise. 
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11. For these reasons, Tri-County elected not to sign the agreement submitted by 
Western Rock, and we believe at this time there is no agreement in place between the parties. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this / / day of April, 1996. 
TERtfY WEA VER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1 ( ^ day of April, 1996. 
Notarial Seal 
Sandra L. Lentz, Notary Public 
Bethel Tyvp., Lebanon County 
My Commission Expires Aug. 24,1998 
' ^ ^ J K 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /*) day of April, 1996, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY WEAVER was mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Terry L. Wade, Esq. 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84771 
\TRI\WEAVER.AFF 
<?S 
Cw^RNEMEtfT SYSTEM3 INC. 
608 E. EVERGREEN RD. 




DATE: November 11995 
TO: Western Back 
ATTN: Wayne Smith 
FROM: Terry L Wearer 
SUBJECT: Escrow Account 
As per oar conversation yesterday i am confirming oar understanding concerning Tri 
County posting security for the account of Precise Concrete^ This is a good faith effort to 
prevent a Ken from being filed on the property of Circle Four Farms* We understand that 
you want to move promptly and will expedite apon conditions below. 
ESCROW CONDITIONS 
1. Tri County agrees to escrow S18S317-26 in interest baring account witfa Western 
legal counsel 
2. Western agrees to suppiy Ken wmivers for same upon receipt of escrow funds 
ESCROW RELEASE CONDITIONS 
1. Western shall use its best effort to collect moneys owed and resolve differences 
with Precise. If this cannot be accomplished in a 6 month period Western has the 
right to draw on escrow for principle amount with out tnterest. 
2. Tri County receives interest on escrow funds. 
GENERAL UNDERSTANDING 
1. Western agrees to provide internal documents to Tri County regarding Precise 
sccount tn order to assiit in concluding matter*. 
2, Western conxsel will draw up escrow document A forward to Tri County. 
Please correspond witfa Ron Soft if there are any questions and I am unavailable. I 
understand thxt Bart Smith is your contact when you are not ISL 
SWINE, rOULTHY. AND LIVESTOCK EQUIPMENT 
tXrt 
Exhibit C 
THOMAS M. HIGBEE (1484) 
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84721 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
F I L $ 
APR 15 1996 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 





SYSTEMS, INC., a Pennsylvania 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD SOLT 
Civil No. »5-CV-115 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
Ronald Solt, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. This affiant is an individual residing in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. This affidavit is 
made upon this affiant's own personal knowledge. 
2. This affiant is the Chief Financial Officer of Tri-County Confinement Systems, Inc., 
a Pennsylvania corporation, doing business in Beaver County, Utah, and the Defendant herein. 
n 
3. On or about November 8, 1995,1 received a telephone call from Wayne Smith, from 
Western Rock Products. I also received a fax transmission by which an escrow agreement and 
a document entitled Agreement were submitted to Tri-County for signature. These documents 
were submitted pursuant to discussions between Mr. Smith and Terry Weaver of Tri-County. 
4. After reviewing the documents, Mr. Wayne Smith and I had a telephone conversation. 
Mr. Smith was in Utah. I was in Pennsylvania. Mr. Smith advised me that unless Tri-County 
signed the documents immediately, as drafted, Western Rock intended to file a mechanic's lien. 
I expressed objection to this, stating that Tri-County needed time to consult with its attorneys 
and to review the documents in detail. At the time I did not know the specifics of the terms 
discussed between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith the day before. 
5. Initially, Mr. Smith remained firm in his position that the documents had to be signed 
and returned, and the funds paid, that day. 
6. I contacted our attorney. Because he was in another meeting, I only had the chance 
to talk to him briefly and he only had the opportunity to review the documents briefly. 
7. After the discussions with our attorney, I again contacted Mr. Smith and explained 
to him the objections which I had to the documents. Those objections included the following: 
A. Tri-County objected to the release clause obtained in the documents. 
B. Tri-County objected to the fact that Western Rock could unilaterally decide 
what efforts, if any, it wanted to expend in pursuing Precise Concrete. 
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C. We did not have sufficient time to review the agreement. 
D. The agreement was couched in the terms of payment to Western Rock, rather 
than as a reserve deposit. 
E. The agreement eliminated the mutuality of performance. 
8. Mr. Smith continued to insist that the funds had to be paid that day, and that the 
documents had to be signed. I continued to insist that we would not sign the documents as 
drafted. 
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the funds into escrow, and to sign the 
escrow agreement with Southern Utah Title Company. As Mr. Smith and I discussed, this was 
done as a show of good faith but was not intended to be a final agreement of the parties since 
the terms of the agreement had not been reached. 
10. I signed the escrow agreement, I deposited the funds by wire transfer, and I sent a 
letter to Mr. Smith indicating that all of this was done pending finalizing the final terms of the 
agreement. A copy of my letter to Mr. Smith is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
11. Mr. Smith and I expressly discussed and agreed that this was not a final completed 
agreement because of the unagreed terms. 
12. There have been subsequent drafts of the agreement exchanged since then. At this 
point, Tri-County does not desire to pursue negotiations or discussions further and believes that 
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the negotiations are at an end without the completion of the contract and believes that the funds 
should be returned to Tri-County. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this J^_ day of April, 1996. 
^RONALDSOLT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this T ^ day of April, 1996. 
Notarial Seal 
Sandra L Lentz, Notary Public 
Bethel Twp , Lebanon County 
My Commission Expires Aug 24 1998 
e ^ - ^ ^ v x <*LK ^  OS - ^LP-WO^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
o 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 1996, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD SOLT was mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Terry L. Wade, Esq. 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart 
P.O. Box 400 
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DATE: November 71995 
TO: Western Rock 
ATTN: Wayne Smith 
FROM: Terry L Wearer 
SUBJECT: Escrow Account 
Ai per oar cocversatioo yesterday i an confirming our understanding concarning Tri 
County posting security for the account of Precise Concrete This ii a good faith effort ta 
prevent a Ken from being filed on the property of Circle Foor Farms. We understand that 
you want to nova promptly and will expedite apon conditions below. 
ESCROW CONDITIONS 
1. Tri County agrees to escrow S185317.26 in iaterest baring account with Western 
legal counsel 
2. Western agrees to luppiy Ken waivers for same upon receipt of escrow funds 
ESCROW RELEASE CONDITIONS 
1»Western shall use its beat effort to collect moneys owed and reseive differences 
with Precise. If this cannot be accomplished in a 6 month period Western has the 
right to draw on escrow for principle amount with out interest. 
2. Tri County receive* interest on escrow foods. 
GENERAL UNDERSTANDING 
1»Western agrees to provide internal documents to Tri County regarding Precise 
account in order ro assist in concluding matters. 
2, Western couxsei will draw up escrow document A forward to Tri Couacy. 
Please correspond with Ron Soft if there are any questions and I am unavailable. I 
understand that Bart Smith is your contact when you are not in-
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AORCEURNT 
THI8 AGREEMENT entered thi* 6th day gf November, 18QSI by and between 
W K T C T N Row FBOOgcm CORPORATION (hereinafter 'Western Rock") and TRI-COUNTY 
CONTt««Kt 8YBrayBi, Iwa (hereinafter TrHCounty1}. 
ftectfALfi 
WHERIAS, TH-Oouhty It me general contractor gn a pro}** located near 
MflfortS, Utah, tn Beaver County ooneMng of the conetrvetlon of Improvement to bo 
uaed In conjynotfen with i hog farming operation (hereinafter tha MHofl Fami Project4); 
WHEREAS, tno Hog Farm Project is ownnd by Clrole Four Realty, a db* of 
Carroifa Poodt of UT, Inc., West late Partners, Inc.. Prwiafle Farms of Utah, inc.. and 
3mfcMWd of Utah, Ino. (hereinafter 'Circle Four); 
WHEREAS, Preoiee Concrete, Ino. (hereinafter •preoico Concrete") waa a 
subcontractor of Trf-County on the Hog Farm Project 
WHEREAS, Weetem Rook eupplled labor, ttcwcca and material* to the Hog 
Farm Project at the re<fUeet of Precis Concrete end pursuant (0 an open credit 
account maintained by foe latter (hereinafter the *Pr*ds* Account0): 
WHEREAS, Pfeciae Concrete i& delfnquent In M payment obligation* to 
Western Rock under the Preciee Account fof Vie eefd labor, aervfcea and material* 
auppiied by Waetota Rock to the Hoe Farm Project; 
WHEREAS, Western RocK haa made demand upon Pmciae Concrete for 
payment of auma owed, but Prodeo Goncrat* haa follod to satiety M W demand; 
WHEREAS, Woetom Rook hw notlltod Cimia Four and Trl-County of Preoiee 
Concrete1* default in ita payment obilgationa to Wert em Rook; 
WHEREAS, W««tem Rock haa further notified Trt-Counly and Circle Four of 
Weatam Rootfe Intention to fife a mechanic^ Hon upon tho Hog Farm Prolooti 
EXHIBIT 3 
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WHEABA8, Circle Four and Tri-County wish to avoid ths filing of a mechanic's 
lien upon the Hog Farm Project; 
WHEREAS, TftCounty ctetoe to satisfy the Precise Account indebtedness and 
thus eroki the fllrrg and enforcement of a mechanic's lion upon said Project; 
NOW THEREFORE, in ooneiderrtion of the mutual promisee And obligation* set 
forth herein, me parti** hereto florae «a follows: 
1. Trt-Oounty ehallj>ey Weeiem Hock the cum of f 186,317.26 in full 
satisfaction end settlement of tumgjnved to_We^em Rock by Precis* Concrete upon 
the Proofs* AoooUnt 1or labor, eeiViOM and materials supplied by Western Rode to the 
Hog Faro Project, The payment of this sum ehoH be made as follow*: 
a. On or before Ave o'clock P.M.. on November 8. 1095, Tri-
County shell cause to bo deposited In an interest bearing escrow 
account (mom futty described hereafter) the said sum of $185,3*7.26 
(hereinafter 'Settlement Funds') in lawful money of the United states of 
America, negotiable and payable without defalcation or discount. 
b. The Settlement Funds shall remain in the escrow account 
for a period of Si* month*, which period shall expire at five o'olook P.M., 
oil May 8.1096, after which time the Sstttamertt Funds end sny accrued 
Interest thereon, ehefl be disbursed by the escrow agont, without further 
svthofixstlen from the pertiee, as follows: 
(1). Western Rock shall recofve the sum of 
*1K,317Jtf; and 
(2) Tri-County shell receive a sum consisting of 
the tmereet Which has accrued upon the Settlement Funds 
white fn the eepow account. 
c. ,h is expreeely understood that performance by the ©*crorw 
agent of its duty to make the disbursements described Above Is 
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conditioned only and exclusively upon the expiration ol Ihe abnnonth 
period. There chaf) be no other eooditione ralallnfl to disbumemfrt from 
••Crow. 
2. An Eaorew Aooount shell be eetaMahed at 8ouinem Utah TMo Compmny 
in St. George, Utah, in accordance with Escrow Instructions in the form attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. The Settlement FUnda depoeitod Into e*c*ow ehaii bo placed by the 
escrow agent In a standard Interest bearing money market account At Sun Capital 
Bank boated in St George, Utah, at 60 South 100 East, St. George, Utah. 
S, Upon reeolpt of the Settlement Fund* (to-wh: $185,317.26) from the 
eeorow. afomdeecrfbedi Western Rock waives and releases all rights to mechanic's 
liens, contract or other daims. Q»sppU5hjcUImflL^s Western Rock may have again* 
Precke Concrete, whfah now exist or which may hereafter anae for labor, eervlods, or 
materials fumlehed on or before the 7th day of September, 1905, a! the request of 
Precise Concrete and upon the Predee Account for the improvements associated with 
the Hog Fa™ Project 
ft Is understood and agreed that this watar is limited to those sums owed to 
Western Rock for tabor. Mn/cac and nuiwmla provided to Pmcke Concrete urttttt th© 
Precise Account, and does not extend to any tabor, sconce* or materials supplied by 
Weetem Rook to anyono ebe tt any othor time for Improvement* upon the Hog Farm 
Project. 
4, Wostam Rook ehsJl attempt 10 coUoct the Precise Account indebtedness 
from Precise Concrete. Western Rock's efforts to do so shall be solely and exdualvety 
determined and Qowftmtd by Western Rock's own diaomtlon, Aooerdingty. Wostorn 
Rock ehelf not bo required to pursue judicial action, nor form*! proceedings of arty 
kind; but rethor, may choote to merely conduct Internal ntegotiadgne In ita attempt to 
oollfc* the Indebtedness. In eum, the often* to be made and/or moihoda to ba um*d by 
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We«tom Rock in thk regard ahall be tho aole and ©wluaJve prerogative of Western 
Bode 
In tho « w t that Weeiem Rode roooevrw a payment of some portion or all of me 
PreeJee Aooount indebtedness (eubjod hereof) from Preci*» Concrete neroaner, 
Weetem Rock w i forward any such funde to Tr^County, 
3. Tri-Cwnty oxpraaaly ecknowledgee that Precise Concrete may aGGert 
that the eume olafrned due by Western Rock on tho Precise Account are Incorrect or 
inaccurate, or.that (he labor, aetvicee or metadata, or aomo portion thereof, eupplied by 
Weetem Rook worn defective. Notwtthetandlng any cuch assertion, and whether It be 
proven oooumta or not, Trt-County hereby watvea any claims! rfghta, dofenaea, or 
caueaa of action It may haw to reduce, offsat or be reimbursed for the Settlement 
Fuhdt being paid by TTVCocmty pursuant to thla Agreomont. 
6. in the event a dispute arise* over the term* of this Agreement, the 
prevailing party, ahafl be entitk>d to any coats Incurred In the enforcement hereof, aa 
weH aa a reasonable attorney1* fee. 
7. Thiii Agreement may be plead .aa a full and complete defer*? to, and 
may be uaed ao the baala tor an Injunction agalnat any action, suit or other proceeding 
Which may be instituted, pnwoouted or attempted In breech hereof, 
6. . It te expresaty understood and agreed that no promla**, warranties, 
reproeentationa, or other understanding* have boon marin, other than thoai whfcfc are 
axpraealy contained or referred to horaln, and that the terms of this Agreement are 
contractual and not a mure recital. 
0. Thlt Agraamont may bo executed in aovanai counterpane and by 
fectmifle ooplea, oecb of-which ahall &e an origin*] and ail of which togother shall 
constitute one Instrument 
10. The undortfgtod partiee further state that tho foregoing Agreement has 
boon read oanpfully and the oontanti thereof known end understood, and that thie 
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documont, M eignod, ia an tot of fie« will, with me imtntion to be legally bound 
thereby. 
WESTER ROOK PRODUCTS OQRPORATION O I f 
•.<&Jftfc" ._ 
UWHnrN6Y.Piifi«i 
STEMS, INO. TRI-COUNTY CONFINEMENT BYSl 
STATE OF ITTAH 
IBS. 
COUNTY Of WASHINGTON ) 
On fhle ft^ day of floVPuh*^ . 1995, before mo personally 
appeared OARRai WHITNEY, whose Identity U personally known to or proved to rne on 
the besfe of sctfafactory evidence, and who, being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), dki 
say thai he i« I M president at WESTERN ROOK PRODUCTS CORPORATION, & corporation, 
and that fro foregolnfl document w(ti signed by him on behalf of that corporation by 
authority of its bylaw* or o f t resolution of flc board of directors, and he acknowledged 
before me that the corporation executed the document and the document wat the act 
of the oorpowrtign for its elated purpose 
R ifc PUBLIC MM ULi 
Address: ,&%?>? *&&& • ^ ,yjt, 
JgTAtYfWJC 
§20 Nam 10*0 £Ml 
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day of . 1995, before me pcreonolty 
, whom* ttfe'ttfty la p*rton«J(y known to or 
proved to.mo on the baala of aetnfadofy evidence, and *ho. being by me duly twom 
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(or affirmod), dfd «dy thct h« *4 the prwktat of TW-CGUNTY CONFINEMENT SYfiTTMS. 
INC., « corporation, tnd thtft the foregoing dooament waa aignod by him on bohalf of 
that cocpofttfart by cuthorfiy of Hi bylaw* or ol A rstolatton ot its board of dimaton*. and 
he acknowtodfcpd baton mo that the corporation fxtcutod the documom and tho 
documom wa* tfwt act of th# corporation for foi ttatod purpow. 
kjTARYPLBUC 
Afldfita: . 
My OommlMton E » k * r . _ . 
1Z 
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November 8, 1&6S 
SOUTHCTN UTAH Tim* COMPANY 
St, Qaoqga. Utah M77Q 
R& Escrow Instruction* for Settlement Transaction between Waatorn Rock 
Product* Corpondon and TrKfcunty Confinement Syotome, Inc. 
Qentfemem 
You am requested to eat at eeorow agent to handle tfw transaction outlined *in 
this latter. Your ftaa ahall ba paid at outlined In the** instructions *nd the 
accompanying document*. Any quaetteni mty be dlreotad to Teny L Wade at 628-
1611. 
Operative D*CUm«ht for Settlement Transaction 
You ara dettvend harawtth the oparattva document outlining the nature and 
form of tha transaction oonaiBting of an Agreement between Western Rock Products 
Corporation ("Western Rock1} pnd Trl-County Confinsment Systems, rno. (Trl-
Oounty*}, dated November 8,1 wS, oonakSnfl of sk pages of text and three pages of 
exhibits, namely these Escra* Inobuctionc (Exhibit A). P U n nivfew thk document 
eansfully In order that you fttty be familiar with the transaction. 
Funda To Bt Deposited 
You W8t reoeive funda from TrkCounty in tha amount Q\ 51R5.317.26. Theaa 
funds (hereafter 'Sodlement Fund*') will be aent by TrnCounty on November 8,1W5. 
via wire transrrieeiort to Sun Capital Bank ('Sun Capfta!*) A] its branch ottloa located at 
AO fiouth 100 East, QL George, Utah, the Settlement Funds chall be payable to 
Southern Utah Title Company In kn oapaotty as Escrow Agent You ara instructed to 
obtain from Sun Capital a cashier's check In tha amount of the Settlement Funds and 
to deposit tha said cashiAt'e eheofc In a standard Interest bearing money market 
account f Eseraw Account*) at Sun Capital. The name of the account chall be Tr>-
County Confinement System*, Inc. and Western Rock Products Corporation in trust by 
Southern Utah Title Company4 
Diabwaament instrurtons 
. The Settlement Funds We to remain In the Escrow Account for a period of six 
months, whkh period shall expire at five o'clock P.M<, on May 8.1696. Immediately 
following tho enrimgeA of ex* said aix-monm parted, you are instructed to dicbure* the 
Battlement F U M A . toQaftw with ooeruad fntarost th«r*on. as follow*: 
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Southern Utah-ntl* Company 
Nowmbter fl. 1095 
P*0eStaf3 
(2) Tri-Coanty ihaJi mceto a aum oonatettog at tha interest 
which has accrued upon the Settlement Fund* white in the Escmw 
Account. 
The dlabursament, etoredeecribed. shell be performed^ automatically, following 
the expiration of the abt-month period, without any further notice or authorization from 
Weatam Rock or TrKfojrty, or from anyone elae. There ahall be no other condhiona 
relating to or In any way Governing or affecting diebureemont. except only the 
oaplraoon of the eaid mx-morrth period. 
General Terete 
The fee* to aet up and' administer tho Eecrow Account aheJI be $1*0.00. and 
ehjui be pekf by Trt^ounty to Southern Utah TWe Company. 
In the avent a dfeputa should eriee ae between Western Rock and Tri»County 
with raapect to thle Escrow Account, the aaid partiea agree to hold Southern Utah r.ne 
Company harmleet from and against any liability or expense resulting to the latter aa 
the raeuit of eucti dttpute, Including the ptyment of a raaaonable attorneys foe and 
OOSQL 
tthould any pvtv detautt In eny of the covenant* or agreementi herein 
contained, that defaulting party Shall pay all costo and exponeea, Including a 
reaeonebfe attoma/a fee, which may eriee or accrue from enforcing the terme of the^e 
Eecrow Instructions, whether auch enforcement Is punmed by fiKng auit or otter*!?*. 
Thaae Eeofow Inatrwrttona may be amandod only In writing signed by the 
peitiaa to thts later. 
TWe Agreement mey be executed In aevaral counterparts and by fectimile 
copies, each of which shall be an original and al of Which bother ehai constitute one 
instrument. 
If 1he foregoing comxrfly eeta fonn your understanding of our agreement for you 
to act * * Eeorow Agent, pieea* execute the cnotoaed copy of this letter In the apace 
Invested below. 
WESTCW ROOK PRODUCTS oonpofunoN Tfii-Couwnr CONFWEMWT StarcMa. INC. 
By ±h^///S UlLLt^ By., -—„ 
DAWttELL WHfTNCY, Prwid^t he 
Tex ID # 
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Sorutboro Utah Tulo Cvinnuny 
Navtnnbor 8. 1905 
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Accepted by Eicm* A6«* thk fth dty of November. IfiQSr 
S4Uth*ni Utah TMt Company 
TOW**** m r M l l O I M a m 9 t « t j | 
mmac A*. f& 
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CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS INC. 
608 E. EVERGREEN RD. 




Mr. Wayne Smith 
Western Rock Products Corporation 
820 North 1080 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Dear Wayne: 
Confirming our conversation of today, I have executed a wire transfer to Southern Utah Title 
Company, through Sun Capital Bank. I have also returned to you via fax the escrow instructions 
pending finalization of the original agreement. 
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